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We study the eect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or
a transaction tax, like the Tobin tax) on the aggregation of private
information in ﬁnancial markets. We analyze a ﬁnancial market à
la Glosten and Milgrom, in which informed and uninformed traders
trade in sequence with a market maker. Traders have to pay a cost in
order to trade. We show that, eventually, all informed traders decide
not to trade, independently of their private information, i.e., an in-
formational cascade occurs. We replicated our ﬁnancial market in the
laboratory. We found that, in the experiment, informational cascades
occur when the theory suggests they should. Nevertheless, the abil-
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C92, D8, G14Non-technical summary
There is a large debate, both among academicians and policy makers,
on the role of transaction costs in ﬁnancial markets. Some have argued
that transaction costs impair the process of price discovery and reduce the
informational ine!ciency of markets. Others have pointed out that they
help to stabilize markets and to prevent the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises, by
reducing the incentives for speculative trading. In recent years, such a debate
has gained new strength, following the proposals by many policy makers
around the world to introduce security transaction taxes (e.g., a Tobin tax),
especially in emerging markets.
In this paper, we will contribute to this debate by developing a theoretical
analysis and testing its results in a laboratory experiment.
We will ﬁrst present a theoretical model in which traders trade an asset
with a market maker. The asset takes value either 0 or 100 and traders
receive a binary signal on its realization. The market maker sets the prices
at which traders can buy or sell. Traders can buy or sell one unit of the
asset or abstain from trading. If traders decide to trade, they have to pay
a transaction cost. We show that the presence of transaction costs causes
no-trade informational cascades, i.e., situations in which all informed traders
neglect private information and abstain from trading. Such blockages of
information can occur when the price is far away from the fundamental value
of the asset and, therefore, cause long-lasting misalignments.
To test our theory, we ran a laboratory experiment. In the laboratory we
observe the private information that subjects receive and we can study how
they use it while trading. In our laboratory market, we replicated the theo-
retical model that we had previously studied. In particular, subjects traded
an asset that could be worth either 0 or 100 units of a ﬁctional currency.
They received a binary signal on its value and had to pay a trade cost of 9
in order to trade. By observing how subjects used their private information,
we could directly detect the occurrence of cascades. In order to run the ex-
periment we recruited undergraduate students at New York University. In
total we recruited 52 students to run 4 sessions; in each session we repeated
the trading game 10 t i m e sa n df o c u s e do nt h el a s t7 times (in order to allow
for the fact subjects need to learn how to play). In the paper, we compare
our results to those of Cipriani and Guarino (2006), who ran a similar exper-
iment but with no trading cost; in this way, we are able to gauge the eect
of transaction costs in the market.
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of no-trade cascades. Moreover, such no-trade sequences usually started when
the price was either very high or very low, as theory suggest they should.
Since informational cascades impair the process of information aggregation,
our experimental result highlight their negative eect on the process of price
discovery.
On the other hand, the presence of trade costs increased the proportion of
rational trades with respect to the benchmark with no trade costs (from 65%
to 82%). A part of this increase in rationality was due to the fact that the
amount of trading against one’s private information (due to herd or contrar-
ian behavior) was smaller than in the benchmark experiment (from 13% to
6%). As a result, the overall eect of transaction costs on the informational
e!ciency of prices was ambiguous. On the one hand, trade costs increase the
incentive to abstain from trading altogether (thus not revealing one’s private
information); on the other hand, they reduce the incentive for subjects in
the laboratory to trade irrationally against their private information; indeed
the average distance between the actual price and the full information price
was 14, similar to that in the benchmark model, 12. Therefore, the results
of our experiment suggests that one should be cautious in arguing that in-
troducing security transaction taxes would have a strong negative eect on
the informational e!ciency of ﬁnancial markets.
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There is a long and widespread debate on the role of transaction costs in
the functioning of ﬁnancial markets. Such costs can be imputed to dierent
reasons, like brokerage commission fees, time involved in acquiring knowl-
edge and record keeping, transaction taxes and so on. It has been argued
that transaction costs can have negative eects on the process of price dis-
covery. The presence of even very small costs makes rebalancing expensive.
Therefore, valuable information can be held back from being incorporated
into prices.
In recent years, such a debate has gained new strength, following the
proposals by many policy makers around the world to introduce security
transaction taxes (e.g., a Tobin tax),1 especially in emerging markets. Op-
ponents have stressed how these taxes can reduce the e!ciency with which
markets aggregate information dispersed among their participants. In con-
trast, proponents have argued that such taxes only reduce excessive trading
and volatility, and can prevent the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises.2
In this paper, we will contribute to the debate on the role of transaction
costs in ﬁnancial markets by developing a theoretical analysis and testing its
results in a laboratory experiment. We will focus, in particular, on the role
of transaction costs in the process of information aggregation.
We will ﬁrst present a theoretical model similar to that of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), in which traders trade an asset with a specialist (market
maker). The specialist sets the prices at which traders can buy or sell. The
prices are e!ciently set according to the order ﬂow, i.e., to the sequence of
trades. Traders can buy or sell one unit of the asset or abstain from trading.
Some traders trade to exploit their private information and others do it for
non-informational (e.g., liquidity) motives. If traders decide to trade, they
have to pay a transaction cost.
We will show that the presence of transaction costs has a signiﬁcant eect
on the ability of the price to aggregate private information dispersed among
dierent agents. Transaction costs cause “informational cascades,” i.e., situ-
ations in which all informed traders neglect private information and abstain
1In 1978, Tobin proposed that all major countries should introduce a tax on foreign-
exchange transactions.
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far away from the fundamental value of the asset. Therefore, transaction
costs can cause long lasting misalignments between the price and the fun-
damental value of a security. Not only informational cascades are possible
in our economy, actually they occur with probability one. Eventually, the
trade cost overwhelms the importance of the informational advantage that
the traders have on the market maker and, therefore, informed agents prefer
not to participate in the market, independently of their private information.
Our results contrast with those of Avery and Zemsky (1998), who show
that informational cascades cannot occur in ﬁnancial markets where trade is
frictionless. In their work, agents always ﬁnd it optimal to trade on the dif-
ference between their own information (the history of trades and the private
signal) and the commonly available information (the history of trades only).
For this reason, the price aggregates the information contained in the history
of past trades correctly. Eventually, the price converges to the realized as-
set value. With trade costs, in contrast, the convergence of the price to the
fundamental value does not occur, since trading stops after a long enough
history of trades. With positive probability no-trade cascades occur when
the price is far from the fundamental value of the asset, even for a very small
transaction cost.
To test our theory, we have run an experiment. A laboratory experiment
is particularly ﬁt to test our theory, since in the laboratory we observe the
private information that subjects receive and we can study how they use it
while trading. In our laboratory market, subjects receive private information
on the value of a security and observe the history of past trades. Given these
two pieces of information, they choose, sequentially, if they want to sell, to
buy or not to trade one unit of the asset at a price e!ciently set by a market
maker. By observing the way in which they use their private information, we
directly detect the occurrence of cascades. The experimental results are in
line with the theoretical model. Indeed, cascades form in the laboratory as
the theory predicts, i.e., when the trade costs overwhelms the gain to trading.
It is worth mentioning that the Avery and Zemsky (1998) model has re-
cently been tested and has found support in experimental studies. Cipriani
and Guarino (2005) and Drehman et al. (2005) have found that informational
cascades rarely occur in a laboratory ﬁnancial market with no ﬁnancial fric-
3For a review of the literature on informational cascades, see Gale (1996), Hirshleifer
and Teoh (2003) and Chamley (2004).
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even if with trade cost cascades do arise, the ability of the price to aggre-
gate private information is not signiﬁcantly aected. This happens because,
with transaction costs, there is a lower incidence of irrational behavior, and,
in particular, of trading against one’s own private information. Indeed, in
our experiment, the level of rationality is very high, higher than in Cipriani
and Guarino (2005). Such a higher level of rationality stems from a sharp
reduction in the frequency by which traders disregard their private informa-
tion (for instance to act as contrarians and trade against the market). This
higher level of rationality makes the price reﬂect private information more
accurately. This explains why the overall impact of transaction costs on the
market e!ciency is very small.
Our theoretical analysis lends credibility to the arguments against the
introduction of a security transaction tax (like a Tobin tax): it is true that
ﬁnancial frictions impair the ability of prices to aggregate private informa-
tion by making informational cascades possible. The occurrence of cascades
is conﬁrmed by the laboratory experiment. As proponents of the tax have
suggested, however, ﬁnancial frictions also reduce the occurrence of irrational
behavior, which improves the ability of the price to reﬂect subjects’ private
information. These two eects oset each other in the laboratory, so that
the transaction cost does not signiﬁcantly alter the ﬁnancial market infor-
mational e!ciency.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the theoret-
ical model and its predictions. Section 3 presents the experimental design.
Section 4 illustrates the experimental results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Analysis
2.1 The model structure
Our analysis is based on a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) type of model. In our
economy there is one asset traded by a sequence of traders who interact with
a market maker. Time is represented by a countably inﬁnite set of trading
dates indexed by w =1 >2>3>===
The market
The fundamental value of the asset, Y , is a random variable distributed
on {0>100},w i t hSu(Y =1 0 0 )=s.A te a c ht i m ew, a trader can exchange
9
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not to trade. Each trade consists of the exchange of one unit of the asset for
cash. The trader’s action space is, therefore, A ={ex|>vhoo>qr wudgh}.W e
denote the action of the trader at time w by [w. Moreover, we denote the
history of trades and prices until time w  1 by Kw.
The market maker
At any time w, the market maker sets the prices at which a trader can buy
or sell the asset. When posting these prices, he must take into account the
possibility of trading with agents who have some private information on the
asset value. He will set dierent prices for buying and for selling, i.e., there
will be a bid-ask spread. We denote the ask price (i.e., the price at which a
trader can buy) at time w by dw and the bid price (i.e., the price at which a
trader can sell) by ew.
Due to unmodeled potential competition, the market maker makes zero
expected proﬁts by setting the ask and bid prices equal to the expected
value of the asset conditional on the information available at time w and on
the chosen action, i.e.,4
dw = H(Y |kw>[ w = ex|>dw>e w),
ew = H(Y |kw>[ w = vhoo>dw>e w).
We also deﬁne the “price” of the asset at time w as the market maker’s
expected value of the asset before the time-w trader has traded, i.e., sw =
H(Y |kw).
The traders
There are a countably inﬁnite number of traders. Traders act in an ex-
ogenously determined sequential order. Each trader, indexed by w, is chosen
to take an action only once, at time w. Traders are of two types, informed
and uninformed (or noise). The trader’s type is not publicly know, i.e., it
is his private information. At each time w, an informed trader is chosen
with probability  and a noise trader with probability 1  . Noise traders
trade for unmodeled (e.g., liquidity) reasons: they buy, sell and do not trade
4We use capital letters for random variables and small letters for their realizations.
For instance, kw is a particular history realized at time w, while Kw denotes any possible
history until that time. Furthermore, to simplify the notation, we write H(=||) to mean
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on the asset value. If an informed trader is chosen to trade, he observes a
private signal on the realization of Y . The signal is a random variable Vw
distributed on {0>100}. We denote the conditional probability function of
Vw given a realization y of Y by (vw|y). We assume that, conditional on
the asset value y, the random variables Vw are independent and identically
distributed across time. In particular, we assume that
(0|0) = (100|100) = tA0=5.
In addition to his signal, a trader at time w observes the history of trades
and prices and the current price. Therefore, his expected value of the asset
is H(Y |kw>v w).
Trading is costly: if a trader decides to buy or sell the asset, he must pay
a transaction cost fA0.E v e r yt r a d e ri se n d o w e dw i t ha na m o u n tnA0 of





y  dw + n  f if [w = ex|,
n if [w = qr wudgh,
ew  y + n  f if [w = vhoo.
The trader chooses [w to maximize H(X(Y>[w>d w>e w)|kw>v w).T h e r e f o r e ,
he ﬁnds it optimal to buy whenever H(Y |kw>v w) Ad w + f, and sell whenever
H(Y |kw>v w) ?e wf.H ec h oo s e sn o tt ot r a d ew h e newf?H (Y |kw>v w) ?d w+f.
Finally, he is indierent between buying and no trading when H(Y |kw>v w)=
dw + f and between selling and no trading when H(Y |kw>v w)=ew  f.
2.2 Predictions
Before moving to the main analysis, it is worth remarking that in this econ-
omy there exist a unique ask and a unique bid at which the market maker
makes zero proﬁts in expected value. As long as there is adverse selection,
the market maker sets a bid-ask spread (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985).
Proposition 1 At each time w, there exist a unique bid and a unique ask
price. Moreover, ew  sw  dw.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to discuss the model’s predictions, let us introduce the concept
of informational cascade. An informational cascade is a situation in which it
11
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information (i.e., to ignore his own private signal).
Deﬁnition 1 An informational cascade arises at time w when
Pr[[w = {|kw>V w = v]=P r [ [w = {|kw]
for all { 5 A and for all v 5 {0>100}.
In an informational cascade, the market maker is unable to infer the
trader’s private information from his actions and to update his beliefs on the
asset value. In other words, in an informational cascade trades do not convey
any information on the asset’s fundamental value.
>From a behavioral point of view, an informational cascade can, poten-
tially, correspond to three dierent trading behaviors, which are of interest
in the analysis of ﬁnancial markets:
1) Traders may disregard their private information and conform to the
established pattern of trade (e.g., after many buy orders, they all buy irre-
spective of their signal). In this case, we say that the traders are herding.
2) Alternatively, traders may disregard their private information and
trade against the established pattern of trade (e.g., after many buy orders,
they all sell irrespective of their signal). In this case, we say that the traders
are engaging in contrarian behavior.
3) Finally traders may simply abstain from trading independently of their
private information.I nt h i sc a s ew es a yt h a tt h e r ei sano-trade cascade.
We now prove that, in equilibrium, the ﬁrst two situations never arise:
traders will never trade against their signal, i.e., engage in herding or con-
trarian behavior. In contrast, an informational cascade of no trades arises
almost surely as w goes to inﬁnity.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, a) a trader either trades according to his
private signal or abstains from trading; b) an information cascade in
which a trader does not trade independently of his signal occurs almost
surely as w goes to inﬁnity.
Let us ﬁrst discuss point a. To decide whether he wants to buy, to sell or
not to trade the asset, an agent computes his expected value and compares it
12
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value will be
H(Y |kw>V w = 100) = 100Pr(Y =1 0 0 |kw>V w = 100) =
100
tPr(Y =1 0 0 |kw)
tPr(Y =1 0 0 |kw)+( 1 t)(1  Pr(Y =1 0 0 |kw))
A
100Pr(Y =1 0 0 |kw)=H(Y |kw)=sw.
Similarly, if he receives a signal of 0, his expected value will be
H(Y |kw>V w =0 )?H (Y |kw)=sw=
Given that, according to the previous result, ew  sw  dw, an agent will
never ﬁnd it optimal to trade against his private information, i.e., to buy
despite a signal 0 or to sell despite a signal 100.5
L e tu sn o wc o n s i d e rpo i n tb :a sw goes to inﬁnity, agents decide not to trade
with probability 1. We refer the reader to the Appendix for a formal proof.
Here let us note that, over time, as the price aggregates private information,
the informational content of the signal becomes relatively less important than
that of the history of trades. Therefore, after a su!ciently large number of
trades, the valuation of any trader and of the market maker will be so close
that the expected proﬁt from trading will be lower than the transaction cost.
Every trader, independently of his signal realization, will decide not to trade.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
5In equilibrium, a trader’s expectation conditional on receiving a signal equal to 100
(0) is not only greater (smaller) than the price, it is also greater (smaller) than the ask
(bid) price, i.e., H(Y |kw>V w =0 )?e w  sw  dw ?H (Y |kw>V w = 100).I f a t t i m e
w a trader receives a signal of 100, his expected value will be H(Y |kw>V w = 100) =
100Pr(Y = 100|kw>V w = 100). On the other hand, dw = H(Y |kw>[ w = ex|) = 100Pr(Y =
100|kw>[ w = ex|). Clearly, Pr(Y = 100|kw>[ w = ex|)=P r ( Y = 100|kw>V w = 100)Pr(Vw =
100|kw)+Pr(Y = 100|kw)Pr(Qrlvh|kw), where, with an abuse of notation, Pr(Vw = 100|kw)
is the probability that the traders in w is informed and has received a signal of 100,
and Pr(Qrlvh|kw) is the conditional probability that the trader in w is noise. Since all
these probabilities are strictly positive and 100Pr(Y = 100|kw)=sw ? 100Pr(Y =
100|kw>V w = 100), it is immediate to see that H(Y |kw>V w = 100) Ad w. By a similar
argument, H(Y |kw>V w =0 )?e w.
13
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equilibrium the market maker would set a bid higher than the expected value
of a trader with a negative signal and an ask lower than the expected value of
a trader with a high signal. As a result, any trader would ﬁnd it optimal to
act according to his private information. The trade cost eliminates such an
incentive. The gain from trade of a trader with a positive or negative signal
is lower than the trade cost. Therefore, any informed trader decides not to
trade. In equilibrium, since trades are uninformative, the market maker sets
both the bid and the ask equal to the price, i.e., ew = sw = dw.
Note that, when an informational cascade arises, it never ends. This hap-
pens because, during a cascade, a trade does not convey any information on
the asset value. After a cascade has started, all the following traders have
the same public information as their predecessor (i.e., nothing is learned dur-
ing the cascade). Therefore, the subsequent traders will also ﬁnd it optimal
to neglect their own private information and decide not to trade, thereby
continuing the cascade.
This result on traders’ behavior has an immediate implication for the
price during a cascade. The market maker will be unable to update his
belief on the asset value and, as a consequence, the price will not respond
to the traders’ actions. The price will remain stuck for ever at the level
it reached before the cascade started. Note that such a level may well be
far away from the fundamental value of the asset. Therefore, in a market
with transaction costs, long-run misalignments between the price and the
fundamental value arise with positive probability. This suggests that, as
opponents of security transaction taxes have claimed, introducing such taxes
can signiﬁcantly impair the process of price discovery.6
The impact of transaction costs in ﬁnancial markets has been discussed
theoretically also by Lee (1998) in a setup dierent from that of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985). Lee studies a sequential trade mechanism in which traders
are risk averse. They receive signals of dierent precisions. Traders can trade
more than once with the market maker and can buy or sell dierent quanti-
ties (shares) of the asset. The market maker, however, is allowed to set one
price only, i.e., in contrast with our setup, there is no bid-ask spread, nor
6Securities transaction taxes are usually levied as a percentage tax on the amount trans-
acted and not as a lump-sum tax. It is easy to show, however, that the theoretical results
that we present in this section would also hold if the transaction cost were modeled as a
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(1998), transaction costs may trigger quasi-cascades that result in temporary
information blockages followed by informational avalanches in which previ-
ously hidden private information is suddenly revealed. Eventually, however,
a complete stop of information occurs. The paper by Lee is very important,
as it ﬁrst discusses the role of transaction costs in the process of information
aggregation. In particular, the idea that a gradual buildup of private infor-
mation is suddenly revealed is obtained as an equilibrium outcome. It should
be noted, however, that his results depend on the market maker ignoring the
information contained in the current trade. As noted by Chamley (2004), in
the absence of this assumption, these results are unlikely to hold. Such an
assumption is di!cult to reconcile with trading between rational agents. In
our model, in contrast, as in any model à la Glosten and Milgrom, the market
maker does take into account the information potentially contained in the
present trade, by setting a bid-ask spread. Despite this, an informational
cascade occurs almost surely.
2.3 A simpliﬁed model
In the remaining part of the paper we will discuss whether the predictions of
the model are supported or not in a laboratory ﬁnancial market. To imple-
ment the model in the laboratory, we made two important simpliﬁcations.
We only had informed traders in the market (i.e., there were no noise traders)
and we allowed the market maker to set one price only (instead of a bid price
and an ask spread).7 These changes were aimed at simplifying the experi-
ment, without losing any important characteristic of the theoretical model.
Of course, since every trader was informed and the market maker could
not set a bid-ask spread, he would make losses in expected value. This was
not a problem in the experiment, since an experimenter played the role of
t h em a r k e tm a k e r . H ec h o s et h ep r i c ei no r d e rt om i n i m i z et h ee x p e c t e d
losses. It is easy to show that the equilibrium price at each time w is just the
expected value of the asset conditional on the information available at time
w,i . e . ,sw.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tP r o p o s i t i o n2 holds true in this simpliﬁed
version of the model too. Indeed, we have proved above that H(Y |kw>V w =
7In the absence of noise traders, had we allowed for a bid-ask spread, the equilibrium
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February 20070) ?s w ?H (Y |kw>V w =1 0 0 ) , which implies that a trader should never trade
against private information when facing a price equal to the expected value
of the asset conditional on the history of trades. Furthermore, also in this
simpliﬁed version of the model, the expected proﬁt from buying or selling
the asset is eventually overwhelmed by the trade cost and no-trade cascades
occur almost surely.
In the experiment we also set particular values for the relevant parameters
of the model. In particular, we assumed the probability of the asset value
being 100, s,e q u a lt o1
2, and the precision of the signal, t,e q u a lt o0=7.
Finally, we set the trade cost, f,e q u a lt o9, which corresponds to 18% of the
unconditional expected value of the asset. This level of the transaction cost is
obviously greater than actual transaction costs, or than reasonable taxes on
ﬁnancial transactions.8 We chose such a high level so that the probability of
the transaction cost becoming binding was high enough to oer a su!cient
number of observations in our analysis. In theory, the transaction costs
become binding with probability 1 irrespective of their size, as the number
of trading dates goes to inﬁnity. In the experiment, the number of trading
dates is, of course, ﬁnite and this dictated the choice of f.9
3 The Experiment and the Experimental De-
sign
3.1 The experiment
This was a paper and pencil experiment. We recruited subjects from un-
dergraduate courses in all disciplines at New York University. They had
no previous experience with this experiment. In total, we recruited 52 stu-
8According to Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2000), in the U.S. stock market, trading
costs in the period 19901998 were equal to 2=2% of the mean returns. Habermeier and
Kirilenko (2003) report that, in Sweden, between 1984 and 1991, taxes on equity trading
were levied at 0=5% and taxes on option trading were levied at 1%. These ﬁgures are lower
than our cost. One needs, however, to consider that, following an informational event, the
number of trades on a stock is very high= As a result, even low levels of transaction costs
or taxes can trigger a cascade.
9In our experiment, each sequence of trades consists of 12 decisions, a relatively large
number compared to similar studies in the literature.
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as subject administrator and 12 acting as traders. The procedure was the
following:
1. At the beginning of the sessions, we gave written instructions (available
from the authors on request) to all subjects. We read the instructions
aloud in an attempt to make the structure of the game common knowl-
edge to all subjects. Then, we asked for clarifying questions, which we
answered privately. Each session consisted of ten rounds of trading. In
each round we asked all subjects to trade one after the other.
2. The sequence of traders for each round was chosen randomly. At the
beginning of the session each subject picked a card from a deck of 13
numbered cards. The number that a subject picked was assigned to
him for the entire session. The card number 0 indicated the subject
administrator. In each round, the subject administrator called the
subjects in sequence by randomly drawing cards (without replacement)
from this same deck.
3. Before each round, an experimenter, outside the room, tossed a coin:
if the coin landed tail, the value of the asset for that round was 100,
o t h e r w i s ei tw a s0. Traders were not told the outcome of the coin ﬂip.
During the round, the same experimenter stayed outside the room with
two bags, one containing 30 blue and 70 white chips and the other 30
white and 70 blue chips. The two bags were identical. Each subject,
after his number was called, had to go outside the room and draw a
chip from one bag. If the coin landed tail the experimenter used the
ﬁrst bag, otherwise he used the second. Therefore, the chip color was a
signal for the value of the asset. After looking at the color, the subject
put the chip back into the bag. Note that the subject could not reveal
the chip color to anyone.
4. In the room, another experimenter acted as market maker, setting the
price at which people could trade. After observing the chip color, the
subject entered the room. He read the trading price on the blackboard
10Subjects were recruited by sending an invitation to a large pool of potential partic-
ipants. For each session of the experiment, we received a large number of requests to
participate. We chose the students randomly, so that the subjects in the experiment were
unlikely to know each other.
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trade. The subject administrator recorded all subjects’ decisions and
all trading prices on the blackboard. Hence, each subject knew not
only his own signal, but also the history of trades and prices.11
5. At the end of each round, i.e., after all 12 participants had traded once,
the realization of the asset value was revealed and subjects were asked
to compute their payos. All values were in a ﬁctitious currency called
lira. In each round students were given an endowment of 100 lire. Each
time a student decided to buy or sell the asset, he would have to pay
a trade cost of 9 lire. Therefore, students’ payosw e r ec o m p u t e da s
follows. In the event of a buy, the subject obtained 100 + (y  sw)  9
lire; in the event of a sell, he obtained 100+(sw y)9 lire; ﬁnally, if
he decided not to trade he earned 100 lire. After the tenth round, we
summed up the per round payos and converted them into dollars at
the rate of 1
65. In addition, we gave $7 to subjects just for participating
in the experiment. Subjects were paid in private immediately after the
experiment and, on average, earned $22=50 for a 1=5 hour experiment.
3.2 The Price Updating Rule
The price was updated after each trade decision in a Bayesian fashion. When
a subject decided to buy, the price was updated up, assuming that he had
seen a positive signal. Similarly, when a subject decided to sell, the price was
updated down, assuming that the subject had observed a negative signal. In
the case of no trade, the price was kept constant. The rationale for this rule
is very simple. In equilibrium, when the trade cost was smaller than the
expected proﬁt from buying or selling the asset, subjects should have always
followed their signal, i.e., they should have bought after seeing a positive
signal and sold after seeing a negative one. On the other hand, not trading
was an equilibrium decision when the expected proﬁt from buying or selling
the asset was not higher than the trade cost. Therefore, in equilibrium, a
buy would reveal a positive signal, a sell a negative signal, and a no trade
would be uninformative.
11Subjects were seated far away from each other, all facing the blackboard. No commu-
nication was allowed in the room. The entrance was in the back of the classroom. When
making his decision, the subject was facing the blackboard, but not the other participants.
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possibility that the cost could be binding only upon receiving a negative
signal and not upon receiving a positive one (or vice versa). Let us consider
the case of a series of buy orders. With our updating rule, after a series of
buys, the price moved from 50 to 70, 84, 93, 97,...At a price of 84, a subject
would be (theoretically) indierent between buying and not trading upon
receiving a positive signal and would strictly prefer to sell upon receiving a
negative one.12 Had we chosen another level of the trade cost (for instance
10), theoretically a no trade would have clearly revealed that the subject
received a positive signal (since he could never decide not to trade with a
negative signal). To be consistent with the theoretical framework, we should
have updated the price. This would have made the updating rule quite
complicated and di!cult to explain to the subjects.13
Of course in the experiment we could observe some decisions o the equi-
librium path: for instance, a decision not to trade when (theoretically) the
12This happens because, when the price is 84 (i.e., after two buys), a trader with a
negative signal has an expected value of 70 and therefore would make a 84  70  9=5
expected proﬁt by selling the asset. In contrast, a trader with a positive signal has an
expected value of 93 and therefore would make a 93849=0expected proﬁt by buying
the asset.
13Keeping the price constant after a no trade is optimal for the market maker only if
we impose some assumptions on the subjects’ behavior in the case of indierence. Not
updating the price after a no trade at the price of 84 is equivalent to assuming that an
indierent subject in this case buys the asset, so that a no trade always is an o the
equilibrium path decision and does not convey any information on the signal that the
subject received.
Similarly, at a price of 93, a subject with a negative signal would value the asset 84 and,
therefore, would be indierent between selling and no trading. A subject with a positive
signal would value the asset 97 and, because of the trade cost, would strictly prefer to
abstain from trading. Not updating the price after a no trade at a price of 97 is equivalent
to assuming that an indierent subject in such a case does not trade, so that a no trade
does not convey any information on the private signal.
After a sequence of sell orders, the price moves from 50 to 30, 16> 7, 3....Similar consid-
erations to those above can be made for no trade decisions at prices of 16 or 7.
The assumptions we made in the cases of indierence, theoretically legitimate, turn out
to be fairly consistent with actual behavior in the laboratory. Indeed, over the whole
experiment, the frequency of a no trade conditional on receiving a bad signal was very
close to the probability of a no trade conditional on receiving a good signal (52% and 51%
respectively), which implies that a rational market maker would have not updated the
price after a no trade. Given subjects’ behavior, for a price of 84, 93, 16 and 7,a f t e ra
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(theoretically) overwhelmed the gain to trading. We assumed that if some-
one bought despite the trade cost, he must have received a positive signal,
and, accordingly, updating the price up was a sensible decision. If someone
sold despite the trade cost, he must have received a negative signal, and,
again, updating the price down was reasonable. Finally, if someone decided
not to trade even though the trade cost was not binding, we did not update
the price. This updating rule is identical to the one used by Cipriani and
Guarino (2005) to analyze a ﬁnancial market where there are no frictions;
therefore, it also facilitates the comparison between our results and those of
that experiment.
It is worth mentioning that a great advantage of our setting is that, as
already mentioned, the price moved through a grid. There were only few
values at which the price was set during the entire experiment.14 In the ﬁrst
three rounds (which we do not consider in our data analysis), subjects had
the opportunity to see exactly how the price moved in response to the order
ﬂow.
In the next section we describe the results. The results refer to the last
seven rounds of each session only.15 We do not take the ﬁrst three rounds into
account for two reasons. First, although the experiment was very easy and
subjects did not have problems in understanding the instructions, we believe
that some rounds were needed to acquaint subjects with the procedures. By
considering only the last 7 session, we concentrate on the decisions taken after
the learning phase. Second, considering only the last seven rounds makes
easier to compare our results to those presented in Cipriani and Guarino
(2005).16
14See the previous note.
15In each round, the 12 subjects were asked to trade in sequence. Therefore, the results
refer to 336 decisions.
16We replicated the analysis considering all ten sessions and we obtained very similar
results (available on request) to those described in the remainder of the paper.
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4.1 Trading Behavior
Now we present the results of our experiment. We will ﬁnd it useful to com-
pare our results to those obtained by Cipriani and Guarino (2005). Cipriani
and Guarino (2005) ran several treatments, studying a ﬁnancial market sim-
ilar to that described in this paper, but with no transaction costs. The
treatment that they label “ﬂexible price” is identical to ours, with the excep-
tion that there is no transaction cost. Therefore, we can use that as a clear
benchmark to evaluate the impact of transaction costs on subjects’ behavior
and on the resulting price paths. We use the label CG-FP to refer to the
ﬂexible price treatment in Cipriani and Guarino (2005).
Let us start by discussing the average level of rationality in the experi-
ment. Given the sequential structure of the game, to classify a decision as
rational or irrational, we need to make some assumptions on each subject’s
belief on the choices of his predecessors. Following Cipriani and Guarino
(2005) we assume that each subject believes that all his predecessors are ra-
tional, that all his predecessors believe that their predecessors are rational
and so on. Under this assumption, a rational subject should always behave
as predicted by the theoretical model.17
The level of rationality is high (see Table 1): 82% of the overall decisions
in the laboratory were rational, i.e., not in contrast with the theoretical
model, while only 18% of actions were irrational. Such level of rationality is
higher than the 65% in CG-FP.18 This increase in the level of rationality is
mainly due to the drop in the proportion of irrational no trades. In CG-FP
subjects should have always traded, in order to exploit their informational
17In the experiment, subjects sometimes made decisions o the equilibrium path, i.e.,
decisions that could not be the outcome of a rational choice. An important issue is how to
update subjects’ beliefs after they observe such decisions. If the decision is a no trade, we
assume that the following subjects do not update their beliefs (which is consistent with our
price updating rule). If the decision is a buy (sell), we assume (again, consistently with our
price updating rule) that the following subjects update their beliefs as though it publicly
revealed a positive (negative) signal (i.e., the signal that implies the lower expected loss).
This last assumption is, in fact, quite innocuous. For instance, if we assumed that trades
that cannot be the outcome of a rational choice do not convey any information, our results
would be virtually identical since, in the entire experiment, we observed only 4 of such
trades (out of 336 decisions).
18According to the Mann-Whitney test, the proportion of rational trades is signiﬁcantly
dierent in the two experiments (p-value=0=03).
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22% of the cases, which added to the level of irrationality. In our experi-
ment, the proportion of no trades was signiﬁcantly higher (51%).19 These no
trade decisions, however, happened mostly when they should have occurred
according to theory: indeed, 79% of no trades occurred when the dierence
between the trader’s expected value and the price was not higher than the
trade cost and, therefore, trading could not be proﬁtable.
19The p-value for the null that the proportion of no trades is the same in the two
experiments equals 0=03 (Mann-Witney test).
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February 2007Table 1: Rational and irrational decisions
Transaction Costs
Rational Decisions 82%
Buying or Selling 41%
No Trading 41%
Irrational Decisions 18%






Buying or Selling 13%
No Trading 22%
Total 100%
In order to understand better the increase in no trade decisions that we
observe with trade costs, we computed the proportion of no trade decisions
for dierent levels of the absolute value of the trade imbalance. The trade
imbalance at time w is deﬁned as the dierence between the number of buys
and the number of sells taken by subjects from time 1 until time w1.A st h e
trade imbalance increases in absolute value, the expected proﬁt from trading
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Proportion of no-trade decisions for dierent levels of the
absolute value of the trade imbalance
Transaction Costs









Both in our experiment and in CG-FP, the frequency of no trades in-
creases monotonically with the absolute value of the trade imbalance. In
CG-FP, however, this increase is modest, the proportion of no trades going
up from 16% with a trade imbalance between 1 and 1 to 33% with a trade
imbalance greater than 3 or smaller than 3. In contrast, in our experi-
ment the proportion of no trades jumps from 21% when the absolute value
of the trade imbalance is at most 1 to 67% when the absolute value is 2 or
3. The proportion of no trades is even higher when the trade imbalance is
higher than 3 or lower than 3. Since for a trade imbalance of at most 1
not trading was irrational, while it was rational after a trade imbalance of 2,
these results conﬁrm that no trade decisions occurred mainly when they were
rational. In a nutshell, the trade cost had a signiﬁcant impact on subjects’
decisions exactly when theory suggests that it should become binding.
Rational no trade decisions are not the only reason for the increase in the
level of rationality in our experiment as compared to CG-FP. The increase in
t h el e v e lo fr a t i o n a l i t yi sa l s od u et oad i erent proportion of trading against
private information. In CG-FP, 13% of all decisions are irrational buys and
sells against private information. In contrast, in our experiment only 6% of
decisions are irrational trades against the private signal.20
20Using the Mann-Whitney test, the p-value for the null that the proportion of trades
against private information is the same in the two experiments equals 0=03.N o t et h a tt h e
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ing decisions in their experiment by invoking contrarian behavior and a mod-
est proportion of herding behavior. Both contrarianism and herding can oc-
cur for a level of the trade imbalance which is high in absolute value. Herding
refers to the situation in which a trader with a signal in contrast with the
past history of trades (i.e., a positive signal after many sells or a negative
signal after many buys) decides to disregard his private information and fol-
low the market trend.21 In contrast, contrarianism refers to the situation in
which a trader with a signal which reinforces the past history of trades (i.e., a
positive signal after many buys or a negative signal after many sells) decides
to disregard both his private information and the market trend.22 In Table
3 we report the proportion of herding and contrarian behavior. In CG-FP,
subjects herded 12% of the time in which herding could arise, and they acted
as contrarians in 19% of the time in which contrarianism could occur. In
contrast, in our experiment, when the absolute value of the trade imbalance
was greater than 2, most of the time subjects preferred not to trade:23 this
explains why both contrarianism and herding are even less pronounced in
our experiment than in CG-FP, which in turn explains why the proportion
of irrational trades is lower.24
6% indicated in the text diers from the percentage (8%)i nT a b l e1 since 2% of trades
were irrational not because they did not agree with private information, but because the
trade cost was greater than the expected proﬁt from trading.
21In particular, following Cipriani and Guarino (2005), we say that in period w there is
a situation of potential herd behavior when the trade imbalance (in absolute value) is at
least 2 and the subject receives a signal against it. If the subject trades against the signal
w es a yt h a th eh e r d s .
22In particular, following Cipriani and Guarino (2005), we say that in period w there is a
situation of potential contrarian behavior when the trade imbalance (in absolute value) is
at least 2 and the subject received a signal agreeing with it. If the subject trades against
the signal we say that he engages in contrarian behavior.
23Note that, according to the Mann-Whitney test, the proportion of contrarianims is
signiﬁcantly dierent in the two experiments (p-value = 0.03), but the proportion of
herding is not (p-value=0.26). This result conﬁrms the ﬁnding by Cipriani and Guarino
(2005) that in the presence of the price mechanism herd behavior rarely arises.
24It is also interesting to note that, when the trade imbalance (in absolute value) was
at most 1 (and, therefore, the trade cost was not binding), irrational decisions to buy
or sell amount to 4%, whereas they amount to 9% in CG-FP. Although this dierence
is not signiﬁcant (p-value=0=14), it seems to suggest that, with trade costs, subjects are
more careful in making their decisions (and, therefore, they use their information more
e!ciently). This may have added to the rationality in the experiment.
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Herd Behavior Transaction Costs CG-FP
Herding 7% 12%
Following Private 29% 46%
No Trade 64% 42%
Relevant cases 70 66
Contrarian Behavior
Contrarian behavior 7% 19%
Following private 23% 63%
No trade 69% 18%
Relevant cases 147 132
4.2 No-trade Cascades
Table 4 shows the sequences of traders’ decisions during the experiment.
We highlighted in gray those periods in which a subject took a decision
facing a price greater than or equal to 93 o rs m a l l e rt h a no re q u a lt o7 and,
therefore, could have rationally chosen not to trade independently of his
private information. In bold we indicated those decisions that were indeed
no trades.
The table clearly illustrates the pervasiveness of no trade decisions. In
many rounds (19 out of the 28) there were indeed long sequences of no trades.
In almost all the cases, the no trade decisions started when the price reached
the level of 7 or of 93. In four rounds only (LY  4>LY  5>LY  7>LY  8)
sequences of no trades started at a price of 16 or 84 and, even more rarely,
at prices closer to 50, the unconditional expected value of the asset.25
[Insert Table 4 about here]
We must stress that our experiment oers a particularly tough test to
the prediction that, when trade is costly, cascades of no trades occur in
25The roman numeral denotes the session. The Arab numeral indicates the round within
each session. For instance, LL5 refers to the ﬁfth round of the second session. Note that
we are reporting only the last 7 rounds of each session of the experiment. This is why, for
instance, the ﬁrst round in session LL is labeled LL  4.
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 from trading
becomes equal to or lower than zero, depending on the signal that the subject
receives. At the price of 93, a rational agent receiving a negative signal has
an expected value of 84 and is indierent between selling and not trading
(since the trade cost is set at 9).26 Analogously, when the price is 7,a
rational agent receiving a positive signal has an expected value of 16 and
is indierent between buying and not trading.27 Therefore, in our setup,
deviations from a cascade of no trades are not necessarily irrational. A no
trade cascade, as deﬁned in Section 2, theoretically occurs at prices of 7
and 93 under the assumption that an indierent agent always decides no
to trade. But, on the other hand, in the laboratory, we may expect some
subjects to follow a dierent (and, still rational) strategy, thus breaking the
cascade. Furthermore, it must be noticed that at a price of 84 a rational
a g e n tr e c e i v i n gapo s i t i v es i g n a li si n d i erent between buying and not trading.
Therefore, theoretically, the price of 93 can only be reached if an indierent
agent buys with positive probability. Similarly, a no trade cascade can arise
at the price of 7 only if an indierent agent at the price of 16 sells with
positive probability. In summary, in our set up, cascades are more di!cult
to form and easier to break.
What happened in the experiment? Given the signal realizations, if all
subjects had been rational and followed the rules indicated in the previous
section in the cases of indierence, a no trade cascade would have occurred
in 25 of the 28 rounds.28 In fact, in the experiment sequences of no trades
did occur in 19 out of these 25 rounds. Sequences of no trades often arose
in the laboratory and were almost never broken. Therefore, the theoretical
prediction of the model ﬁnds strong support in the laboratory.
4.3 The Price Path
Figure 2 presents the price paths in the dierent rounds of the experiment.
Recall that we updated the price up after a buy, down after a sell, and
26In contrast, a rational agent receiving a positive signal has an expected value of 97
and, therefore, his optimal choice is to abstain from trading.
27In contrast, a rational agent receiving a negative signal has an expected value of 7
and, therefore, his optimal choice is to abstain from trading.
28In particular, this is true under the assumption that an indierent agent buys (sells)
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we described above manifest themselves as sequences of periods in which the
price remained constant. These sequences, as it is easy to observe, were quite
pervasive during the experiment.
Let us now discuss how this trading behavior aected the ability of prices
to aggregate private information. In order to do so, we analyzed the distance
between the ﬁnal actual price (i.e., the price after all subjects have traded)
and the full information price (i.e., the price that the market maker would
have chosen if the signals had been public information). Figures 3 and 4 show
this distance and contrast it to that in CG-FP. By comparing our results with
those in CG-FP, two interesting dierences emerge. First, in our experiment
we have one instance in which distance between the ﬁnal price and the full
information price was greater than 50. This was the instance in which a
misdirected cascade arose (i.e., the full information price, 84, was above the
unconditional expected value, whereas the actual price, 16, was below it).
This never happened in CG-FP. Second, in CG-FP 50% of the time the
dierence between the ﬁnal price and the full information price was less than
5 lire, whereas this happens only 21% of the time in our experiment. Since
with trade costs subjects often stopped trading whenever the price was 7 or
93, it was less common for the dierence between the full information price
and the ﬁnal price to become very small.
The average distance between ﬁnal actual price and the full information
price is 14=5 lire. Had subjects behaved in a perfectly rational manner, such
a distance would have been 14 lire.29 This reﬂects the similarity between the
behavior observed in the laboratory and that predicted by the theory.
Cipriani and Guarino (2005) report a distance between last actual prices
and full information prices of 12 lire. In their case, however, theoretically the
distance should have been 0. Therefore, in CG-FP, there was a misalignment
of the price with the fundamental value of the asset (which is expressed by
the full information price) due to the irrational trades in the laboratory. In
contrast, in our experiment, the inability of the price to aggregate private
information completely cannot be attributed to a signiﬁcant discrepancy be-
tween theoretical and actual behavior: indeed the level of irrationality (and,
29This theoretical distance is obtained using, for the cases of indierence, the same
assumptions explained above when we discussed informational cascades. An alternative
way of computing the last price would be to assume that, when indierent, subjects always
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more speciﬁcally, the proportion of trades against private information) is
signiﬁcantly lower than in CG-FP. The distance between actual and full in-
formation prices is due to the presence of transaction costs, that reduced the
incentive of subjects to reveal their private information by placing orders on
the market.In conclusion, the overall eect of trade costs on the informational ef-
ﬁciency of prices is ambiguous: on the one hand, trade costs reduce the
incentive for subjects in the laboratory to trade irrationally against their
private information; on the other hand, they increase (both theoretically
and experimentally) the incentive to abstain from trading altogether. In our
experiment, these two forces oset each other and, as a result, the ability
of prices to aggregate private information is not signiﬁcantly dierent from
the case of a frictionless market studied in the laboratory by Cipriani and
Guarino (2005).
These results help to shed some light on the possible eect of a tax on
ﬁnancial transactions, like a Tobin tax. It has been argued, by opponents of
the tax, that such a tax would generate misalignments of asset prices with
respect to the fundamentals. Our analysis supports this view: by introducing
a wedge between the expectations of the traders and of the market maker,
a tax on ﬁnancial transaction may prevent the aggregation of the private
information dispersed among market participants. On the other hand, as
proponents of the tax have suggested, a tax on ﬁnancial transaction reduces
the incidence of irrational trading by market participants, and in particular,
of herding and contrarianism. These two eects oset each other in the
laboratory so that the introduction of a security transaction tax does not
signiﬁcantly alter the ability of the price to aggregate private information.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have analyzed the eects of transaction costs in ﬁnancial markets through
a theoretical model, and have tested the predictions of the model through a
laboratory experiment. We have shown that transaction costs cause informa-
tional cascades in which all traders abstain from trading, independently of
their private information. This theoretical result is supported by experimen-
tal evidence: we observed cascades in our laboratory market when the theory
predicts that they should indeed arise. Informational cascades impair the
process of information aggregation, and may create a misalignment between
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the price and the fundamental value of an asset. In this sense, our theo-
retical and experimental results highlight the negative eect of transaction
taxes (e.g., the Tobin tax) on the process of price discovery. Our experimen-
tal results, however, suggest that one should be cautious in concluding that
introducing a transaction tax would have a strong eect on the informational
e!ciency of the ﬁnancial market. In fact, by comparing the results of our
experiment to previous experimental results on markets without frictions, we
found that the presence of a transaction cost does not aect the convergence
of the price to the fundamental value in a signiﬁcant way. This is due to the
fact that transaction costs reduce the frequency by which agents irrationally
trade against their private information.References
[1] Avery, Christopher and Zemsky, Peter. “Multidimensional Uncertainty
and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets.” American Economic Review,
September 1998, 88(4), pp. 724  748.
[2] Chamley, Christophe. Rational Herds. Economic Models of Social Learn-
ing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[3] Cipriani, Marco and Guarino, Antonio. “Herd Behavior in a Laboratory
Financial Market.” American Economic Review, 2005, 95(5), pp. 1427 
1443.
[4] Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, Ananth. “Liquidity, Volatility and Eq-
uity Trading Costs across Countries and over Time.”.International Fi-
nance, 2001, 4(2), pp. 221  55.
[5] Forbes, Kristin. “Comment on "Securities Transaction Taxes and Finan-
cial Markets".” IMF Sta Papers, 2003, 50(Special Issue), pp. 181186.
[6] Gale, Douglas “What Have We Learned from Social Learning?” European
Economic Review, 1996, 40,p p .617  628.
[7] Glosten, Lawrence and Milgrom, Paul. “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices
in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders.” Journal
of Financial Economics,M a r c h1985, 14(1),p p .71  100.
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No 736
February 2007
[8] Habermeier, Karl and Kirilenko, Andrei. “Securities Transaction Taxes
and Financial Markets.” IMF Sta Papers, 2003, 50(Special Issue), pp.
165  180.
[9] Hirshleifer, David and Teoh, Siew H. “Herd Behaviour and Cascading in
Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis.” European Financial Manage-
ment,M a r c h2003, 9(1), pp. 25  66.Addendum to “Transaction Costs and Informational Cascades in
Financial Markets:
Theory and Experimental Evidence”
Note: The following are the instructions for the experiment. The instruc-
tions were distributed to the subjects and read aloud. The experiment was
run at New York University in 2001.
1 Instructions
1.1 Introduction
You are about to engage in an experiment in market decision making. Various
research institutions have provided funds for this experiment and, if you make
appropriate decisions, you may earn a good monetary payment.
1.2 The experiment
The experiment consists of a series of 10 rounds. In each round you will have
the opportunity to make a trade. You will perform this experiment with 12
other people. When it is your turn to decide to trade you will be oered a
price at which you can either buy one unit of a good, sell one unit, or decide
not to trade. The good you are trading will ultimately be worth either 0
or 100 units of an experimental currency called “lire.” These lire will be
converted into dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of $1 = 65
oluh. Whether the good will be worth 0 or 100 lire will be determined at the
beginning of each round by ﬂipping a coin: if the coin lands head the value
will be 0 lire and if the coin lands tail it will be worth 100 lire. Hence, there
is a 1
2 chance of the good having a value of 0 or 100.T h e o u t c o m e o f t h e
coin ﬂip will not be revealed to you, so when it is your turn to trade you will
not know the value of the good. You will, however, receive some information
about which value is more likely to have been chosen.
Before starting the experiment we will choose one of you as the subject
administrator. The subject administrator will help us to run the experiment:
in particular, he will toss the coin that determines whether the good is worth
0 or 100 lire. The subject administrator will not trade during the experiment
and will receive a payo equal to the average payo received by all of you.
31
ECB
Working Paper Series No 736
February 2007Moreover, we will assign a number (from 1 to 12) to everyone, to help us to
keep track of your trades during the experiment. Write the number assigned
to you on your worksheet, after your name.
Procedures for each round.
First, the subject administrator will ﬂip a coin. The outcome of this ﬂip
will determine the value of the good: if the coin lands head the value will be
0 lire and if the coin lands tail it will be 100 lire. Of course, you will not be
told the outcome of the coin ﬂip.
Second, we will start calling you to trade, using your identiﬁcation num-
ber. The order in which you are called is randomly decided by the subject
administrator by using a deck of cards.
Third, when you are called to trade, you will draw a chip from one of two
boxes. While both boxes contain only two types of chips, white chips and
blue chips, the proportion of the two types of chips in each box is dierent
(it will be veriﬁed by the subject administrator of the experiment). One box
contains 70 blue and 30 white chips and the other box 30 blue and 70 white
chips. If the value of the good is 0 (as determined by the coin ﬂip), we will
ask you to draw the chip from the box that contains 70 blue and 30 white
chips. If the value is 100, we will ask you to draw the chip from the box that
contains 70 white and 30 blue chips. To recap:
• If the value is 100,t h e nt h e r ea r em o r eW H I T Ec h i p si nt h eb o x .
• If the value is 0, then there are more BLUE chips in the box.
Therefore, the chip that you choose will give you some information about
the value of the good. After you draw the chip and look at its color you
will put it back into the box, so that the number of chips in the box never
changes. The color of this chip is your private information — do not share it
with any other subject.
Forth, immediately after you draw the chip from the box, we will ask
you if you want to buy, to sell or not to trade at a given price. Everyone can
observe the choices that have been made by the previous players and the price
at which they traded (we will write them on the blackboard). Therefore,
when you make your decision (sell, buy or no trade), you know what the
people who traded before you decided to do. You will record the price at
which you trade and your decision (check one among Buy, NT=No trade,
and Sell) in columns 2 and 3 of your worksheet in the row referring to Round
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buy or sell transaction will take place. Remember that at that price you can
buy, sell or decide not to trade. However, if you decide to buy or sell, you
have to pay a cost of 9 lire; you do not have to pay the 9 lire if you decide
not to trade. The price oered to you will be computed as if it were the price
set in a perfectly competitive market given the buy and sell decisions made
in the past. The price oered to the ﬁrst trader will be 50 lire. This price
is set at 50 b e c a u s ei ti sh a l fw a yb e t w e e n0 and 100 a n de a c ho ft h e s et w o
values has a 1
2 chance of being correct. After the ﬁrst player makes his/her
decisions, we will update the price. If this person buys, we will increase the
price and the person who comes second will face a higher price. If the ﬁrst
trader sells, we will revise the price downward and the second person will
face a price lower than 50 lire. The same will happen for all of the following
trades: when a person buys we will increase the price and when he sells we
will lower it. The reason for this price setting is simple. At the beginning
50 lire is the best guess of the value of the good, given that the values 0 and
100 are equally likely. When a person buys, we calculate that the value of
the good is higher than the posted price and therefore we increase the price.
When there is a sell, we calculate that the value of the good is lower than
the posted price and therefore we decrease the price. The exact amount by
which we change the price depends on the working of competitive markets:
the price at each turn is the best guess of the good value given the decisions
taken by the subjects in the previous turns.
At the end of the round, after all subjects have made their buy, sell, or
no-trade decisions, you will be informed of the value of the good in that round
and of your payo. You will write this value and your payo in columns 4
a n d5o ft h er o wr e f e r r i n gt oR o u n d1 .
Your per-round payo
Your payo in any round will be determined as follows.
You will ﬁrst be given 100 lire just for trading in the round. Therefore,
• I fy o ud e c i d et ob u ya tt h ep r i c es you will get
100 + Yd ox h s  9.
• If you decide to sell at the price s you will get
100 + s  Yd ox h 9.
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Why these payos? If you buy, you get the value of the good and you
have to pay its price. If you sell, you have to borrow the good in order to
sell it. You get the price at which you sell and have to repay the value of the
good. In both cases of buy and sell you have to pay a trade cost of 9 lire.
Therefore, when you buy, you will gain lire if the value of the good is
higher than the price plus 9 lire and lose them if it is lower. When you sell,
you will gain lire if the price is higher than the value plus 9 lire and lose them
if it is lower. Always remember that the value of the good can be either 0 or
100.N o t i c ea l s ot h a ta tm o s ty o uc a nl o s e9 lire in a round, given that we
give you 100 lire for trading.
Examples of the per-round payo.
Suppose when it is your turn to trade the price is 70= There are two
possibilities: either the good is worth 0 or it is worth 100. If you decide to buy
and the good is worth 0, then you get 100+0709=2 1 .I nt h i sc a s ey o u
lose your money, because you bought for a price of 70 s o m e t h i n gt h a ti sw o r t h
0= If you buy and the good is worth 100, then you get 100+100709 = 121.
In this case, you earn more money because you bought for only 70 lire a good
that is worth 100 lire. If you decide to sell and the good is worth 0,t h e ny o u
get 100 + 70  0  9=1 6 1 . In this case you earn more money, because you
sold for a price of 70 something that is worth 0= If you sell and the good is
worth 100, then you get 100+701009=6 1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,y o ul o s ey o u r
money because you sold for 70 lire a good that is worth 100 lire. Finally, if
you decide not to trade, you will simply keep your initial 100 lire.
After the twelfth subject has made his/her decision, the ﬁrst
round is over. We will then proceed to the second and third rounds where
the same procedures of the ﬁrst round will be repeated. At the beginning
of the new round, the value of the good will be determined by a new coin
ﬂip. When your turn comes, you will draw another chip and trade the good,
according to the same rules described for the ﬁrst round. You will also be
given 100 new lire. You will proceed to the Round 2 and 3 rows of your
worksheet and record there the color of your chip and your trade decision.
How your ﬁnal payment is determined. For the simple fact that
you show in time for the experiment you earn $7. The rest of the payment
d e p e n d so nh o wy o up e r f o r m .F i r s t ,w ew i l ls u mu py o u rp a y o s in lire for
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# grooduv =
# oluh
65 . For instance, if after 10 rounds you made 1000 lire you
will receive 1000
65 dollars, that is, $15=40. Your ﬁnal payment will be equal to
this amount plus the $7.
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6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove the existence of the ask price. Because of unmodeled potential
Bertrand competition, the ask price at time w, dw, must satisfy the condition
dw = H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w].
L e tu sd e ﬁ n eLw as a random variable that takes value 0 if the agent at
time w is noise and 1 if he is informed. The expected value of the asset at
time w, given a buy order at the ask price dw is
H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]=
H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w>L w =1 ]P r [ Lw =1 |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]+
H[Y |kw]Pr[Lw =0 |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w].
Let us consider the correspondence # :[ 0 >100]  [0>100] deﬁned as
#(dw): =H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w], and let us make the following observations:
1) If dw AH [Y |kw>V w =1 0 0 ] f, Pr[Lw =1 |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]=0and
H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]=sw.
2) If dw = H[Y |kw>V w =1 0 0 ] f then an informed trader receiving Vw =1 0 0
can randomize between buying and no trading. Therefore,
H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]=
H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w>L w =1 ]P r [ Lw =1 |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]+
H[Y |kw]Pr[Lw =0 |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]),
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Vw =1 0 0buys with zero probability, then Pr[Lw =1 |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]=0
and H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]=H[Y |kw]. If he buys with probability 1,t h e n
H[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]=H(Y |kw>V w =1 0 0 ) P r ( Lw =1 >V w =1 0 0 |kw>|>e w)+
H(Y |kw)Pr(Lw =0 |kw),w h e r e| is an ask price strictly lower than H[Y |kw>V w =
100] (i.e., the probability Pr(Lw =1 >V w = 100|kw>|>e w) is computed assuming
that an informed trader buys with probability 1). Finally, if he buys with
any probability belonging to (0>1),t h e nH[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w] takes any
value between these two levels.
3) If H[Y |kw>V w =0 ] f?d w ?H [Y |kw>V w =1 0 0 ] f,t h e nH[Y |kw>[ w =
1>d w>e w]=H(Y |kw>V w =1 0 0 )P r ( Lw =1 >V w =1 0 0 |kw>d w>e w)+H(Y |kw)Pr(Lw =
0|kw),w h e r e ,a g a i n ,Pr(Lw =1 >V w =1 0 0 |kw>|>e w) is computed assuming that
an informed trader buys with probability 1).
4) If dw ?H [Y |kw>V w =0 ] f,t h e nH[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w]=H[Y |kw].
5) Finally, if dw = H[Y |kw>V w =0 ] f,t h e nH[Y |kw>[ w =1 >d w>e w] takes
any value between the two levels found in observations 3 and 4 (the argument
to show this is identical to the argument used in observation 2).
Observations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 imply that the correspondence # is piecewise
constant. Furthermore, for dw = H[Y |Kw>V w =1 0 0 ] f and dw = H[Y |Kw>V w =
0]  f, #(dw) takes all the values belonging to the intervals indicated above
in observations 2 and 5. T h e r e f o r e ,i ti si m m e d i a t et os e et h a tt h ec o r r e -
spondence #(dw) is non empty, convex-valued and has a closed graph. By
Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem, the correspondence has a ﬁxed point. Fur-
thermore, recalling that H(Y |kw>V w =0 )?s w ?H (Y |kw>V w =1 0 0 ) ,b yu s i n g
the same observations, it is straightforward to check that such a ﬁxed point
is unique.
The proof of the existence and uniqueness of the bid price is analogous.
The proof that ew  sw  dw follows immediately from the proof in Glosten
and Milgrom (1985, p. 81).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the Proposition, we ﬁrst prove the following lemma.30
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February 2007Lemma In each market, Dw, Ew and Sw converge almost surely to the
same random variable (i.e., the bid-ask spread converges almost surely to 0).






















where we use these two facts: i) S1 = H[Y ] and, therefore, Yd u[S1]=0 ;
ii) the sequence of prices {Sw>w=1 >2>===} is a martingale with respect to the
history of trades and prices, and the increments of a martingale have zero
expected value and are uncorrelated. Let us deﬁne the expected squared
increment of the price at time n conditional on information available at time
n as {n := H [(Sn+1  Sn)2|Kn>D n>E n]. Then, by the tower property of













Furthermore, given that Sw is the expected value of Y conditional on Kw,







Now, let us deﬁne the random variable
*n := Pr[[n =1 |Kn>D n>E n]Pr[[n = 1|Kn>D n>E n]=
Note that in the event of a buy at time n t h ep r i c ea tt i m en +1will be
equal to the ask at time n; in the event of a sell, it will be equal to the bid
at time n; and in the event of a no trade it will be in between these bid and




2 +( En  Sn)
2¤
.
By assumption, noise traders buy and sell with strictly positive proba-
bilities. Therefore, *n is bounded away from zero by a positive number *.
Hence,







[(Dn  Sn)2 +( En  Sn)2]=
Finally,

















Working Paper Series No 736
February 2007Given that the variance of the fundamental is bounded and that * is

















? 4, which implies, as is easy to show,31 that
Dw and Sw converge almost surely to the same random variable and, similarly,
Ew and Sw converge almost surely to the same random variable.32
Now, we prove Proposition 2 in two steps.
Step 1
In this step, we show that if at time w,f o ra l lv 5 {0>100},
H[Y |kw]  f?H [Y |kw>V w = v] (A1)
and
H[Y |kw>V w = v]  f?H [Y |kw],( A 2 )
then, in equilibrium, Pr[[w = {|kw>V w = v]=
Pr[[w = {|kw],f o ra l lv 5 {0>100} and for all { 5 A, i.e., an informational
cascade occurs.
Proof of step 1
Suppose that at time w (D1)a n d( D2) hold and the market maker sets
dw = ew = H[Y |kw]. Then, the conditional probability of a buy order given
the trader’s information is
Pr[[w =1 |kw>V w = v]=( 1 )%E,
where %E denotes the probability of a buy order by a noise trader. On the
other hand, the conditional probability of a buy order conditioned on the













(Pr[|Dn  Sn|  %]) ? 4> which implies that Dw converges almost
surely to Sw.
32Note that, if private information were completely uninformative (i.e., the signals were
independent of the realization of the asset value), the bid-ask spread would equal 0 starting
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Pr[[w =1 |kw]=( 1 )%E.
Finally, note that, since Pr[[w =1 |kw>V w = v]=P r [ [w =1 |kw],t h e
expected value of the asset conditional on [w =1and the public information
is indeed H[Y |kw]. Therefore, dw = H[Y |kw] is the equilibrium ask price.
An identical analysis shows that, when (D1)a n d( D2)h o l d ,
Pr[[w = 1|kw>V w = v]=P r [ [w = 1|Kw]
and ew = H[Y |kw] is the equilibrium bid price.
Finally, Pr[[w =0 |kw>V w = v]=P r [ [w =0 |kw]=( 1 )(1  %)+.
Step 2: Now we prove that there exists a time W such that for any wAW,
(D1) and (D2) will be satisﬁed almost surely.
Proof of step 2
Let us deﬁne the random variable Xw which takes value 1 if at time w an
uninformed trader arrives in the market and value 0 if at time w an informed
trader arrives in the market. We can now prove step 2 by contradiction.
Assume that there does not exist a W such that (D1) and (D2) hold almost
surely for all wAW. This means that, for any w, H[Y |kw]f  H[Y |kw>V w =0 ]
or H[Y |kw>V w =1 0 0 ] f  H[Y |kw] or both.
Recall that, in equilibrium,
Pr[Vw =0 >X w =0 |kw>[ w =1 ]=0
and
Pr[Vw =1 0 0 >X w =0 |kw>[ w = 1] = 0.
Therefore, the conditions for equilibrium ask and bid prices at time w are:
(dw  H[Y |kw])Pr[Xw =1 |kw>[ w =1 ]+
(dw  H[Y |kw>V w = 100])Pr[Vw =1 0 0 >X w =0 |kw>[ w =1 ]=0 .
(H[Y |kw]  ew)Pr[Xw =1 |kw>[ w = 1] +
(H[Y |kw>V w =0 ]  ew)
Pr[Vw =0 >X w =0 |Kw>[ w = 1>D w>E w]=0 .
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almost surely to the same random variable. For almost every history and for
any e %A0, there exists a time e W such that for any wAe W, (Dw H[Y |Kw]) ? e %
and (H[Y |Kw]Ew) ? e %. Hence, for almost every history and for every b %A0,
there exists a time b W such that for any wAb W,
(Dw  H[Y |Kw>V w = 100])Pr[Vw =1 0 0 >X w =0 |Kw>[ w =1 ]? b %>
and
(H[Y |Kw>V w =0 ] $  Ew)Pr[Vw =0 >X w =0 |Kw>[ w = 1] ? b %.
Moreover, since the ask and the bid converge almost surely to the price,
for almost every history and for every %A0, there exists a time W  b W such
that, for any wAW,
(Sw  H[Y |Kw>V w =1 0 0 ] )P r [ Vw =1 0 0 >X w =0 |Kw>[ w =1 ]?%
and
(H[Y |Kw>V w =0 ] Sw)Pr[Vw =0 >X w =0 |Kw>[ w = 1] ?% .
Summing up both sides of the two inequalities, we have:
(H[Y |Kw>V w = 100]  Sw)Pr[Vw =1 0 0 >X w =0 |Kw>[ w =1 ]
+(Sw  H[Y |Kw>V w =0 ] )P r [ Vw =0 >X w =0 |Kw>[ w = 1] ? 2%.
Now, suppose (D2) is violated. Then, Pr[Vw =1 0 0 >X w =0 |Kw>[ w =
1] =: e A0. From the above inequality, H[Y |Kw>V w =1 0 0 ] Sw ? 2%
e  .B y
choosing %  1
2e f , this implies that (D2) holds, a contradiction. A similar
contradiction arises assuming that (D1) is violated.
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February 2007Figure 3: Distance between the theoretical and the actual last prices in CG-FP
Figure 4: Distance between the theoretical and the actual last  price
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February 2007Table 4: No Trade Cascades
Session I 
IV S B B B S S B B S B S S 
V NT  S S NT  NT  B S B S B B B 
VI B B NT  S S NT  B B NT  NT  B NT
VII B B B NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
VIII B NT  B B B S S NT  B NT NT S
IX NT  B S B B S NT  S B B NT  NT 
X NT  B B B S B NT B NT NT NT NT
Session II 
IV B NT  NT  B S NT  S NT  S S NT  NT 
V B B B NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
VI B B B NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
VII B S NT  NT  S S S NT NT NT NT NT
VIII S S NT  S NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
IX B B B NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
X B B B NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT NT
Session III 
IV S S S NT NT NT NT NT NT B B B 
V S B S S S NT B S NT NT NT NT
VI S S B S B S S NT NT NT NT NT
VII S S S NT NT B NT  S NT NT NT NT
VIII B B B NT S B NT NT NT NT NT NT
IX S S S B S NT NT NT S NT NT NT
X S S NT  S NT NT NT NT NT B NT  S 
Session IV 
IV NT  B B B NT S B S NT  NT  NT  NT 
V S S S S B B  NT NT NT S  NT NT
VI NT NT NT NT S  S  B  S  S  NT NT NT
VII S B NT  B NT  S S S NT  NT  B NT 
VIII B  B  NT NT NT NT NT NT NT B  NT NT
IX B  NT S  NT NT B  NT B  B  S NT  B 
X NT  B S B B B S NT  NT  B S B 
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